O problema de drept interesantă legată de recursul compensatoriu. Sau dacă și când România ar putea fi obligată sa adopte măsuri în aceasta chestiune

Comitetul de Miniștri a dat termen României pana in decembrie 2020 sa adopte măsurile concrete in problema condițiilor din penitenciare și sa prezinte pana atunci efectele acestora. Puțin probabil sa se întâmple ceva pana atunci având in vedere ca sunt alegeri anul acesta, iar politicienii au folosit ca arma chestiunea recursului compensatoriu.

In finalul documentului se menționează ca, dacă România nu se supune deciziei, se ia in considerare adoptarea unei rezoluții interimare (interim resolution) împotriva acesteia.

Aceasta rezoluție interimara nu are vreun efect concret de presiune asupra statului, doar se poate constata ca statul respectiv nu respecta deciziile CEDO, ca nu respecta Conventia. Adică e mai mult un fel de “avertisment” din zona contravenționala. Și se pot adopta mai multe astfel de rezoluții interimare.

Pasul următor, pus la dispoziție prin Protocolul nr. 14 la Convenție (din 2010), este o procedura de infringement împotriva României (nuclear option).

Iata care sunt efectele:

“The idea of introducing infringement proceedings as a procedural possibility in the Convention was set out by the Parliamentary Assembly to the Council of Europe in its Resolution 1226(2000) and followed up in Assembly Recommendation 1477(2000). The initial proposal was to amend the Convention to introduce a system of “astreintes” (daily fines for a delay in the performance of a legal obligation) to be imposed on states that persistently fail to execute a judgment. The Recommendation does not indicate whether the Committee of Ministers or the Court was intended to have the power to impose a fine.

116. The proposal to impose fines was not ultimately taken up in Protocol 14 but it initiated a debate which led to the insertion of Article 46 § 4 in the Convention. That debate was about the need to increase the Committee of Ministers’ powers when supervising the execution of judgments. As it states in the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14.

This infringement procedure does not aim to reopen the question of violation, already decided in the Court’s first judgment. Nor does it provide for payment of a financial penalty by a High Contracting Party found in violation of Article 46, paragraph 1. It is felt that the political pressure exerted by proceedings for noncompliance in the Grand Chamber and by the latter’s judgment should suffice to secure execution of the Court’s initial judgment by the state concerned.

Currently the ultimate measure available to the Committee of Ministers is recourse to Article 8 of the Council of Europe’s Statute (suspension of voting rights in the Committee of Ministers, or even expulsion from the Organisation). This is an extreme measure, which would prove counter-productive in most cases; indeed the High Contracting Party which finds itself in the situation foreseen in paragraph 4 of Article 46 continues to need, far more than others, the discipline of the Council of Europe. The new Article 46 therefore adds further possibilities of bringing pressure to bear to the existing ones.”

Decizia de a declanșa procedura de infringement se ia cu votul de 2/3 și, pana la cauza Mammadov c Azerbaidjan, s-a considerat ca e aproape imposibil de atins numărul necesar pentru a o declanșa. Imposibilul s-a produs in 2017 in aceasta cauza, iar pe 29.05.2019 Marea Camera a Curtii a adoptat și o hotărâre in acest caz.

Este o hotărâre care merita citită împreuna cu toate opiniile concurente formulate (Jud. Motoc a semnat 2 opinii concurente).

“Those travaux préparatoires highlight a series of issues which the drafters of the Convention raised and which remain relevant today. The drafters were conscious of the difficulties linked to the execution of the Court’s judgments. In parallel, they drew comparisons with the International Court of Justice, whose institutional structure served as a model for constructing the European Court of Human Rights. Hence, as the travaux préparatoires show, the States’ concern was that, in the absence of an international police force, the judgments might remain without effect. Furthermore, most of the participants in the travaux préparatoires pleaded on behalf of the role of public opinion in a democracy. It is most interesting to note that the European Movement’s draft stated clearly that the drift to dictatorship did not occur automatically, as illustrated by Germany before the Second World War. Once the Council of Europe had been proposed as the organisation responsible for the execution of judgments, Belgium’s representative, Mr Schmal, expressed the fear that only the weakest countries would be required to execute judgments, while the strongest would never be required to do so.”

Hotărârea in cazul Mammadov suna in felul următor:

“In response to the question as referred to it by the Committee of Ministers, the Court concludes that Azerbaijan has failed to fulfil their obligation under Article 46 § 1 to abide by the Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan judgment of 22 May 2014.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Holds that there has been a violation of Article 46 § 1 of the Convention.”

In concluzie, se pasează responsabilitatea executării Comitetului de Miniștri care ar putea suspenda dreptul de vot al statului sau chiar sa fie exclus din organizație.

Pentru mine sunt clare doua lucruri:

1. Romania ocupa un loc de frunte pe lista rușinii, respectiv a statelor care nu respecta drepturile omului. Și nici nu pare a dori sa facă ceva in acest sens.

2. Nu exista o procedura de coerciție rapida împotriva statului, iar măsurile pe care le poate lua Comitetul de Miniștri sunt extreme. O varianta intermediara, a posibilității de a aplica amenzi pentru fiecare zi de întârziere, cred ca ar fi fost mai oportuna.

Text de av. Silvia Uscov din Baroul București

Comments

comentarii